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Efficient Secure AC OPF for Network
Generation Capacity Assessment
Chris J. Dent, Member, IEEE, Luis F. Ochoa, Member, IEEE, Gareth P. Harrison, Member, IEEE, and
Janusz W. Bialek, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper presents a novel method for determining
the capacity of a network to accommodate new generation under
network security constraints. The assessment is performed by
maximizing the total generation capacity in an optimal power
flow model; this is solved by gradually adding limited numbers
of line outage contingencies, until a solution to the complete
problem is obtained. The limit on the number of contingencies
added is key to the method’s efficiency, as it reduces the size of
the optimization problems encountered. Moreover, varying this
limit on contingencies added provides a simple and highly efficient
means of searching for multiple local optima of the nonlinear
optimization problem. The method has been tested on a modified
version of the highly meshed IEEE Reliability Test System with
N-1 security, where a significant reduction in the system’s capacity
for new generation is seen when security constraints are imposed.
The method is generic and may be applied at any voltage level, for
other security models and for other similarly structured problems
such as the analysis of multiple resource availability scenarios.
Index Terms—Load flow analysis, optimization methods, power
generation planning.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the current drive toward renewable and other low-carbon generation, the geographical pattern of gener-
ator locations is changing. As a result, there is now significant
penetration of generation in parts of the network, particularly
the distribution network, where formerly there was mainly load.
A range of technical impacts (e.g., voltage rise, reverse power
flows) dictate the amount of generation that may be connected
without resort to network reinforcement. To maximize the po-
tential of a network to support such distributed generation, it
is important that these factors are carefully assessed, as poorly
placed generation can significantly reduce the total potential for
connecting generation [1]. Effective and efficient methods of as-
sessing the capacity of the network to accommodate generation
are therefore important, and there is a need to incorporate as
many of the relevant technical constraints as possible, including
security considerations.
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Several authors have proposed mathematical optimiza-
tion-based approaches to network-wide planning of generation
capacity and location, as opposed to considering one-genera-
tion site at a time. These have included a linear programming
model to determine the optimal allocation of generation [2],
tabu search in a loss minimization problem [3], and the use of
a genetic algorithm to solve a multiobjective problem, consid-
ering losses, costs, and power generated [4]. In addition, earlier
work involving two of the present authors has demonstrated
the use of an ac optimal power flow (OPF) model to assess a
network’s capacity to accommodate generation [1], [5]. That
framework forms the basis for this study.
The OPF was originally developed in the 1960s for network-
constrained economic dispatch and has since been applied to
many other problems [6], [7]. Its use in assessing the capacity of
networks for connecting generation differs from the economic
dispatch OPF both in the objective function (maximum network
generation capacity, as opposed to minimum operating cost) and
the decision variables (the capacity of potential generators, as
opposed to the output of fixed-capacity generators). In addition,
for economic dispatch the fixed demand limits the degree of
network congestion. Here, the maximization of capacity, with
surplus generation above the local demand being exported to
an external grid, brings about greater levels of congestion; in a
sense, the question is “how hard can the network be run?”
All transmission networks and many distribution networks
are designed to operate in a secure mode to ensure continuity of
supply under an outage (or contingency) of a circuit (N-1 secu-
rity), or in some cases any two circuits (N-2). The constraints
imposed by secure operation reduce the transfer capacity of
the network, and specialized approaches have been developed
to solve the resulting large security-constrained OPF models
(SCOPF). One common option is to preselect a limited number
of outage contingencies, which are likely to be significant [6].
An alternative approach, which allows efficient consideration
of all contingencies, is to build a solution to the full problem by
solving a series of subproblems, in which appropriate combina-
tions of contingencies are added at each iteration [8].
This paper presents a new efficient solution method for
OPF models used to assess network generation capacity under
security constraints. The method is demonstrated on a modified
version of the meshed IEEE 73-bus Reliability Test System
(RTS) [9] with N-1 security, in which new generators are given
firm connections. The method is, however, generic and may
be applied at any voltage level, for other security models, and
for other similarly-structured problems such as the analysis of
multiple availability/demand scenarios for renewable resource
availability. This solution approach brings two major advances.
First, it resolves the problem that greater network congestion is
0885-8950/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE
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encountered in comparison to security-constrained operational
cost minimization, while still ensuring convergence of the
OPF algorithm. Second, it provides a means of searching for
multiple locally optimal solutions to the OPF model while
retaining the great efficiency benefits arising from the use of
warm starts in classical optimization algorithms.
II. OPTIMIZATION MODEL
The OPF model for generation capacity assessment without
security constraints is discussed in detail in [1]. The mathemat-
ical structure of the constraints is very similar to more familiar
OPF application of cost minimization. The principal and fun-
damental difference lies in the objective, which is to the total
generation capacity in the network:
(1)
where is the set of possible locations for new generation,
and is the MW generation capacity allocated to site ; if
generation exceeds local demand, the excess is exported to an
external network. Using a continuous variable for generation
capacity at each site is appropriate for a variety of distributed
sources, where individual generator unit ratings might only be
a few MW.
This formulation implicitly assumes firm connections. At dis-
tribution level, this correctly models the common situation in
which the network operator is unable to dispatch generation. At
transmission level, where generation may be constrained at cost
to the system, this model will show the absolute potential of
network sections for new generation (in a complete transmis-
sion system, where substantial exports are not possible, gener-
ation and load must be balanced at all times; in this case an as-
sessment of potential for new generation is not relevant without
market considerations.)
Modifying this formulation to perform a cost benefit analysis,
including the cost of existing generation, a simple network up-
grade model [5], and possibly the cost of additional interconnec-
tion to other networks, is relatively straightforward; the solution
technique, which is the main point of this paper, would be un-
changed. As discussed in Section III, the degree of congestion
in generation maximization is higher than in the cost minimiza-
tion; as a consequence, even if there are other terms present,
rewarding increased generating capacity in the objective func-
tion requires a modified solution approach.
The control variables in the optimization model are the new
generator capacities, which are the engineering decisions made
by the model. The other decision variables in the optimization
problem are state variables. Furthermore, features such as Var
sources and tap changing transformers may be included using
standard power flow equations [10] without changing the so-
lution technique. The intact-network constraints are standard
power flow equations, apart from the presence of new gener-
ators; these add an extra power injection term in the Kirchhoff
current law constraints.
For the security model, constraints are added to represent the
power flow equations for each contingency (i.e., circuit outage)
considered. The reference bus is located at an external connec-
tion. In the intact network power flow equations, all external
connections are equivalent (in the nonsecurity-constrained OPF,
the only special feature of the reference bus is its role as the ref-
erence for voltage phase; the voltage levels at all external con-
nections, along with the voltage phase at connections other than
the reference bus, are decision variables.) The reference bus is
the slack bus in the contingency power flow equations, in which
it is a bus. Any other external connections are modeled
as buses in the contingency flows. Where there is just
one external connection, this may still have multiple circuits for
security purposes, but the detail of these connections is not mod-
eled.
New generation and load buses are also modeled as
nodes, while any existing voltage-controlling generators are
nodes. The new generators are run in constant power
factor mode, as is common with distributed generation [11],
with the power factors of all the new generators equal. It is
reasonably straightforward to use voltage or other control
modes instead [12]. Thermal, voltage, and generation level
constraints are included to ensure that the power flow remains
feasible postcontingency; the emergency (postcontingency)
voltage and flow limits may differ from their precontingency
values. Postcontingency ramp rates are not explicitly taken into
account in the contingency constraints, but the time required
for system restoration will partly determine how much the
emergency limits can be relaxed from the normal state ones.
A full mathematical formulation of the optimization model is
given in the Appendix.
III. SCOPF SOLUTION METHOD
A. Previous Approaches
In a secure dc OPF, the linearity of the problem allows in-
dividual contingency flow constraints to be included, without
having to add the entire set of contingency power flow con-
straints. In the nonlinear ac OPF, however, limiting the post-
contingency flow on one line when another suffers an outage
requires the inclusion of the entire postcontingency power flow.
Many approaches to the solution of large-scale ac SCOPFs have,
therefore, involved the pre-selection of a small number of the
most significant contingencies. Examples include [13], where
the two most important contingencies in a very large system are
chosen manually, and [14], where a sophisticated automatic se-
lection is performed.
The methodology presented here develops that of Alsac and
Stott [8] to solve the generation maximization problem effi-
ciently. They used an iterative process where first the nonse-
cure OPF is solved, and then all contingencies in which power
flow constraint violations occur are added to the security model.
The resulting SCOPF is then solved, and the process repeated
until no violations are found. As mentioned earlier, in generation
maximization the level of congestion is much greater, because
generation is limited only by the network constraints rather than
by demand. As a result, when the base case OPF is solved, many
(indeed possibly all) of the contingencies will show network
constraint violations, using the original Alsac-Stott algorithm
developed for cost minimization, these would all be added to
the OPF model. Direct solution of the resulting large optimiza-
tion models requires substantial computer time.
This paper shows that great computational benefits can be ob-
tained, while still guaranteeing convergence of the algorithm, by
limiting the number of contingencies added at each stage (and
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Fig. 1. Solution algorithm for the security constrained OPF.
hence size of the OPF models solved). It will also be seen that,
where this is necessary, it is possible to search efficiently for
multiple local solutions by varying this limit on contingencies.
A related approach to solving SCOPF problems has been pro-
posed independently [15] and applied to cost minimization. As
demonstrated for the first time here, this class of approach is of
particular importance in applications such as generation maxi-
mization where flows are not limited by nodal demands. More-
over, it will be shown that the varying the limit on contingen-
cies added provides a highly efficient means of searching mul-
tiple local optima of the nonlinear optimization problem, where
warm starts are critical to the efficiency of a solution method, a
simple multiple-start approach may be very time consuming.
B. Solution Methodology
The proposed solution method for the SCOPF is as follows
(see also Fig. 1). is the set of all contingencies considered,
is the set of contingencies explicitly included in the
SCOPF, is the contingencies to be added to (removed
from) , and is the contingencies, which have never
been removed from .
1) Initialize the security model with (no contingen-
cies initially in security model). Initialize (no
contingencies yet removed from security model).
2) Solve SCOPF with contingencies . For contingencies,
which were included in the previous SCOPF, warm start
the contingency variables from their values in the previous
solution. For contingencies not in the previous OPF, warm
start the contingency variables from the previous base case
solution.
3) Define to be all contingencies in with no
active voltage, reactive power, or flow limit constraints.
4) Run contingency load flows for all contingencies in
, i.e., those not considered in the SCOPF.
a) If more than contingencies give constraint viola-
tions, define the set to be the contingencies,
whose load flows give the most constraint violations.
b) Otherwise, define to be all contingencies giving
constraint violations.
5) Terminate algorithm if no constraints are violated in these
load flows.
6) Update the list of contingencies in the SCOPF, .
a) Add the contingencies in to the SCOPF, i.e., in
set notation update .
b) Remove the contingencies in from the SCOPF
and also from (the set of contingencies
which have never been removed), i.e., update
and .
7) Go to Step 2.
Any constraint violations detected in load flow runs (i.e., in con-
tingencies not included in the most recent SCOPF model) will
be eliminated in subsequent SCOPF solutions, which explicitly
consider greater numbers of contingencies. When the algorithm
terminates, it does so at a local minimum of the SCOPF, in-
cluding warm starting from all contingencies, not just those ex-
plicitly included in the security model .
This algorithm includes three augmentations beyond the sim-
plest possible implementation of Alsac and Stott’s approach:
1) Warm Starting From the Previous Solution: It is to be ex-
pected that appropriate warm starts will accelerate the solution.
Here, the intact network variables from the previous SCOPF so-
lution are used as the starting values of new contingency vari-
ables. Using contingency variables from the previous solver run
for the warm start requires slightly more complex coding and
gave no consistent benefit in run time.
2) Limit on the Number of Contingencies Added: The Alsac-
Stott method may add a very large number of contingencies to
the security model on the first iteration. Moreover, explicitly
including the most severe contingencies in the security model
may also eliminate violations in other contingencies, which are
not explicitly considered (the former are sometimes known as
umbrella contingencies [16].) It is, therefore, more efficient to
limit the number of contingencies added on each iteration to the
worst in terms of constraint violations.
3) Removal of Contingencies From the Security Model: The
removal of contingencies in Step 6 attempts to identify those
whose explicit consideration is unnecessary; this takes the idea
behind restricting the number added a step further. The size of
the OPFs solved is thereby reduced, leading to a corresponding
reduction in the time taken per OPF solution. The restriction
that a contingency may only be removed once from the security
model is necessary to ensure eventual termination of the algo-
rithm, as eventually all contingencies must be added if termina-
tion has not occurred. This prevents the algorithm from cycling,
alternately adding and removing the same contingency. How-
ever, for the test cases run here, the benefit in time per OPF so-
lution is more than cancelled out by the requirement for a greater
number of OPF runs. Detailed results including contingency re-
moval are, therefore, not presented in this paper; it would be
interesting to investigate whether contingency removal is bene-
ficial on other networks or classes of problem.
C. Implementation
The model is coded in the AIMMS optimization modelling
environment [17]. In addition to OPF models, AIMMS can also
be used to run the necessary load flow problems (this is achieved
by formulating an optimization problems with a constant objec-
tive function. The optimization solver then looks for feasibility
alone and acts as a nonlinear equation solver.) Use of a modeling
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language reduces development times, because the model struc-
ture may be specified as on paper, with the data being stored sep-
arately. AIMMS then generates the specific instance of the opti-
mization problem from the model structure and data and passes
it to the solver, also providing automatic generation of first and
second derivatives of the constraint functions when required.
The AIMMS may be linked to a selection of efficient com-
mercial solvers; here, the CONOPT generalized reduced gra-
dient solver [17] is used. With default settings, it proved to
be competitive with the KNITRO interior point solver [17] in
terms of speed and was absolutely reliable in convergence for
the SCOPFs in this paper. While KNITRO was slightly faster
than CONOPT when it did converge, using standard settings
it frequently failed to do so when the number of contingencies
included exceeded low single figures. Both solvers are able to
handle large numbers of hard nonlinear equality and inequality
constraints automatically and exactly.
Occasionally, load flows did fail to converge in CONOPT on
early iterations of the algorithm. However, as long as these do
not occur later on, this does not risk the method terminating un-
successfully. It is likely that if the load flows were implemented
using specialized code, they would be faster and more robust,
but this would be at the expense of greatly increased develop-
ment time.
IV. CASE STUDY
A. Test Problem
To demonstrate the solution method, a modified version of the
IEEE 73-bus RTS is used. It consists of three identical 24-bus
networks and interconnections between them. The RTS layout
is shown schematically in Fig. 2, along with a more detailed
plan of area 1. It is not intended to be representative of any
particular power system, but it provides a convenient, reason-
ably large-scale heavily meshed network on which to demon-
strate the SCOPF solution method. This test problem shows the
method’s efficiency on large problems with many line outage
contingencies, but the method is generic across different voltage
levels and security models.
A total of 15 new generation units are allowed to be connected
at buses 1, 2, 7, 15, and 22 in each area of the RTS. The line char-
acteristics of the RTS remain the same but the original demand
specified was halved (to 4.22 GW) to ensure a feasible problem.
In real-world applications, the algorithm would typically be run
for the “worst case” scenario, which for an exporting network
would be maximum generation and minimum load.
One hundred and five contingencies are considered in the as-
sessment including all single-line outages except lines 10, 11,
16, 17, and 23 in each area. Including any of these would leave
an infeasible problem; lines 211 and 311 are single-circuit ra-
dial connections.
In order to demonstrate the flexibility of the proposed method,
calculations are performed with either one or four external inter-
connections, and one or three existing voltage-controlled gen-
erators in each area of the RTS (these are not the same as the
generators in the original RTS specification; only the original
layout and line properties are used.) The four cases are described
in Table I. All external interconnections are modeled as having
unlimited capacity (with finite capacities the solution technique
would be unchanged), and the reference bus is always located
Fig. 2. Lower panel: schematic representation of the IEEE 73-bus RTS in-
cluding interconnections; each of the three identical areas contains 24 buses.
Upper panel: area 1 of the RTS, dashed lines to X’s indicate connections to
external connections, dot-dashed lines indicate connections to other areas of
the RTS, and new generator sites are marked with the conventional generator
symbol.
TABLE I
EXTERNAL INTERCONNECTIONS AND EXISTING GENERATOR LOCATIONS
FOR THE FOUR NETWORK CASES. s g DENOTES THE CASE
WITH   EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS AND  EXISTING GENERATORS
at bus 325. In the cases with three existing voltage-controlling
generators, each has real power output of 800 MW and reactive
power limits of MVar; where there are nine generators,
each has real power output of 200 MW and reactive capability
of MVar.
B. Results
The OPF model was run for each case, both with and without
security constraints. The optimal new generation capacities
available in the network are shown in Table II.
The results without security constraints show that for the two
cases with a single interconnection, the connectable capacities
are very similar. There is slightly more capacity available where
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Durham. Downloaded on March 09,2010 at 07:47:22 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
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TABLE II
LOCALLY OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE FOUR NETWORK CASES
(* INDICATES THAT MULTIPLE LOCALLY OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS
WERE FOUND IN THESE CASES—SEE FIG. 3)
Fig. 3. Locally optimal solutions found for the cases with nine existing
generators.
there is a greater number of voltage-controlling existing genera-
tors; it appears that despite a larger existing generating capacity
(s1g3: 2400 MW; s1g9: 1800 MW) the greater overall reactive
capability in s1g3 allows slightly more (86 MW) new genera-
tion to connect. The two cases with four export connections have
greater connectable capacities, as the particular constraints af-
fecting bus 325 are less important. The available capacity differs
much more between these cases; this is explained by the differ-
ence in existing generating capacity ( MW).
As expected, in all cases there are distinct reductions in ca-
pacity when the security constraints are applied. These reduc-
tions range from 16% for the two cases with a single export con-
nection (s1g3 and s1g9) up to 43% for case s4g9. Again there
is a pattern in the capacities. The single connection cases each
show secure capacities of around 2.5 GW. The multiconnection
cases now show fairly similar secure capacities and hence dif-
ferent reductions relative to nonsecure conditions. The differ-
ence in existing generating capacity appears to play little part
in these cases under secure conditions. The reason for this dif-
fering behavior between the nonsecure and secure cases is not
clear; this issue demonstrates one benefit of using mathemat-
ical tools to analyze complex nonlinear problems, where a more
heuristic approach might not be able to account for all relevant
phenomena.
Although the results are entirely repeatable between runs,
not all runs find precisely the same optimal capacity. As Fig. 3
shows, the cases with nine existing generators, and particularly
those with multiple network interconnections, have multiple lo-
cally optimal solutions depending on the number of contingen-
cies added.
Fig. 4. Optimal generation site capacities with and without security constraints
for case s4g3.
For the cases with just one existing generator in each area,
just one locally optimal solution is found; however, for cases
s1g9 and s4g9 multiple locally optimal solutions were found
depending on the limit on contingencies added, as shown in Fig.
3. It would appear that when there is more than one voltage-
controlled generator that produces or consumes reactive power
in each area, and particularly when there are also four external
connections through which power may be exported, the greater
flexibility in the system results in these multiple locally optimal
solutions. The difference in capacity between different locally
optimal solutions is fairly small: for the single connection case,
the worst solution differs from the best by around 1.4%, while
for the multiconnection case, the worst solution is around 5%
below the best.
It is also informative to examine capacities at individual loca-
tions (the layout of area 1 of the RTS is shown in Fig. 2.) Fig. 4
shows the individual site capacities with and without security
constraints applied for s4g3. It is immediately apparent that in
most cases, when N-1 security is introduced, the capacities do
not scale equally. For instance, the capacity at bus 322 decreases
by 63%, while that at bus 122 barely changes. Most of the gen-
eration is sited at buses 15 and 22 in each area of the reliability
test system, which are those closest to the external connections.
Where there are significant differences between the three areas
of the RTS, this is partly explained by the pattern of intercon-
nections between areas. For example:
1) When security constraints are imposed, considerable
generation capacity transfers from bus 102 to 107. Bus
107 has an interconnection to area 2, so it appears to be
a robust site for generation under N-1 security. Buses
207 and 307 do not have a similar interconnection, and
no similar transfer of capacity is seen in areas 2 and 3.
2) The main loss of capacity between the nonsecure and
secure models is at buses 115, 222, and 322. Unlike
bus 115, the “equivalent” buses 215 and 315 are near
interconnections to areas 1 and 2, respectively, making
them robust sites under security constraints. Similarly,
bus 122 is near the interconnection from 121 to 325,
whereas there is no similar interconnection near 222 or
322.
Once more, the finer detail of the results is determined by the
subtle interplay between the various voltage and thermal con-
straints in the SCOPF model.
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Fig. 5. Time taken to solve to local optimality for network cases s1g3 and s4g9,
for a range of limits on contingencies added. The other two cases gave similar
plots.
C. Performance of Algorithm
This section compares the performance of the algorithm with
more conventional approaches. As timings of runs in AIMMS
(running under Windows XP with an Intel 2.13-GHz dual core
processor and 2 GB of RAM) varied slightly from run to run,
the times given are the smallest of three runs, to reflect most
accurately the actual processor time used; for the three runs the
actual calculations performed were identical, but the time taken
for completion could vary substantially between runs because of
other active processes on the PC. The calculation results were
repeatable between runs. The memory usage for the very largest
models was around 550 MB; this is smaller than the physical
memory of any modern PC.
Fig. 5 shows the solution times for cases s1g3 and s4g9,
plotted against the maximum number of contingencies added
per iteration . The shortest times were around 50 and 100 s,
respectively. For comparison, direct solutions of the various
cases were performed using flat starts [i.e., all variables ini-
tially zero except the voltage levels, which were set to 1 per
unit (p.u.)]. The resulting mathematical programs had around
100 000 variables and constraints. In cases s4g3 and s1g3, for
which only one locally optimal solution was found, the solu-
tion found by this direct method was the same as that found by
the approach presented in this paper; this demonstrates the va-
lidity of the new method. For case s4g3, the direct solution with
flat starts took around 11 300 s; direct solution warm starting
from the base case (without security constraints) OPF solution
reduced execution time to 513 s.
The effectiveness of the enhanced features of the algorithm
described in Section III-B is discussed in the next paragraphs.
1) Warm Starts: As expected, using warm starts accelerates
convergence of the algorithm. Run times using flat starts are not
plotted, as in all calculations performed they were at least three
times greater than the warm start run times.
2) Limit on the Number of Contingencies Added: As seen in
Fig. 5, the smallest run times occur when the limit on the
number of contingencies added is between about 5 and 20.
With no limit on the number of lines added at each stage, the
run times were 194 s without removal and 240 s with removal for
network case s4g3 (33 contingencies are then added on the first
iteration.) In the other cases, without the limit almost all of
the contingencies are added in the first stage, and the algorithm
then terminates as there are no violations in the remaining con-
tingencies. The run times are then 458 (case s1g3), 908 (s4g9),
and 550 s (s1g9). By comparison with Fig. 5, it is clear that im-
posing the limit on contingencies added is beneficial in all cases.
The total time taken is a tradeoff between the time for each
OPF solution (smaller at low due to both the smaller opti-
mization problems and the better warm starts) and the number
of iterations (which as expected is smaller at large ). With the
best times for this network occurring for of between 5 and
20, the lower end of this range is probably a good starting point
for single runs on other problems. Choosing too big a value for
carries a risk of large, hard mathematical programs being en-
countered; adding fewer than five contingencies is likely to re-
sult in long run times due to the increased number of iterations.
V. DISCUSSION
The method offers an efficient means of determining the net-
work capacity available for generation connection, for a given
network configuration and loading condition, and with consid-
eration of security constraints. It would also provide an effective
means of assessing single sites as it offers an automated means
of determining whether a proposed connection exceeds the ca-
pacity of the network without the need for extensive manual ex-
amination of multiple scenarios. Furthermore, as demonstrated
in [1], there is also the option to use it to examine the impact of
planning or connection decisions on future network capacity.
In a monopoly utility, this approach could be used directly
in decisions on generator locations. In a liberalized market,
where ownership of the network and generators are separate,
it could find application within the process of determining
use-of-system charges; within such a framework, the method
could indicate good and bad places for generators to connect.
The structure of the method is such that it can be used not only
in the large meshed network shown here, but also where a dis-
tribution network is run in radial mode but security of supply is
maintained using network reconfiguration. The method assumes
that generation capacity is firm, but reliability and variability of
generators could be taken into account using capacity factors
such as those defined by the U.K. Energy Networks Associa-
tion [18]. Further work is planned on both of these aspects.
The method can also be used for other contingency types,
such as generator trips [19] and network reconfiguration. One
key point is whether a very high proportion of contingencies in
any one category restricts the optimal solution; if this is the case,
it might be most efficient to force their addition to the model
early on in the solution process.
In addition to the substantial efficiency benefits it brings for
a single run, the ability to vary the limit on contingencies added
can bring greater benefits still in problems with multiple local
solutions. The solution found using the “sequential warm start”
method is necessarily a local solution of the SCOPF including
all contingencies. However, due to the nonconvexity of the ac
OPF, there is no way of proving that the global solution has been
found [20], even when runs of the algorithm with different
have produced just one solution (although it is likely that the
single solution is then the global one).
For large nonconvex nonlinear optimization models such
as this, there are no efficient general purpose global solution
methods available. In practice, therefore, it is typically best
to perform multiple runs of the same problem with different
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starting points. In a sense, this has already been done by using
different values of . For network case s4g9, where several
different local minima were found, the best and most common
solution is probably the global optimum. If multiple starts
of the same process are required, this is complicated by the
criticality of warm starts to the efficiency of the algorithm
(possibly rendering impractical the simplest option of choosing
random starts with initial values for variables chosen from their
whole range). The ability to choose different in the same
algorithm, therefore, provides a simple means of performing
multiple starts, which also resolves the issue of which gives
the quickest run time and best solution for an unseen problem.
This benefit would apply in any SCOPF problem and not just
generation maximization ones with an enhanced degree of
network congestion.
In a distribution network, it is relatively unlikely that very ex-
tensive meshing, or significant numbers of voltage-controlling
generators or interconnections will be encountered. It appears
more likely then that a single local optimum will be found. In
any case, in many planning applications, it is not absolutely nec-
essary to know for certain that the best local optimum found is
the global optimum; a technique is valuable if it finds a solu-
tion, which is better than those obtained by other means, and
any good local optimum may, therefore, suffice. This might not
be the case, however, where an ac OPF is given statutory au-
thority, e.g., if it is used for generator dispatch in a pool system.
A similar issue arises where two different local solutions have
similar objective function values. In this case, the difference
in solution quality may well be within the approximation error
in the model formulation, while the optimal values of decision
variables are very different. This situation has indeed been seen
in the more complex network cases run on the RTS. For instance,
in the case s4g9, when the limit on contingencies added
changes from 8 to 9, the locally optimal objective changes by
0.63%; however, the average change in optimal generator ca-
pacities in area 1 is then 13.3%. Once more, if different local
solutions would influence contractual decisions, then this is a
particular cause for concern. On the other hand, under some cir-
cumstances it might be regarded as beneficial to have a range
of good locally optimal solutions with similar objective func-
tion values, with a final decision being made on other grounds;
where multiple local optima exist, this method provides a way
of finding these multiple options.
All results here are based on the CONOPT 3.14A solver; it
is possible that that contingency removal may still prove useful
when working with other solution techniques (e.g., interior
point) or indeed on other networks. If a different solver is to be
used, it must be remembered that while they can be highly effi-
cient, interior point methods are generally so not well suited to
warm starts [21], as CONOPT’s generalized reduced gradient
method. As demonstrated here, complications arising from the
presence of large numbers of nonlinear equality constraints are
expected to be due to multiple local solutions, rather than any
features of the solution method such as warm starting.
This work is currently being extended to problems involving
nonfirm access with generation curtailment and multiperiod
calculations including consideration of variability of renewable
resources [22]. In such applications, the number of scenarios
considered grows exponentially with the number of renew-
able resource profiles. Direct solutions on realistic network
models could, therefore, involve extremely large optimization
problems, and the benefit from the method presented here is,
therefore, expected to be considerable.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a method for determining the capacity
of a network to accommodate generation under security con-
straints, making use of an OPF model designed to maximize
generation capacities. The maximization of capacity, as opposed
to cost minimization, brings about greater levels of congestion
as power transfers in the network are not limited by fixed de-
mand. For this application, therefore, specialized solution ap-
proaches are especially valuable.
The model is solved by gradually adding limited numbers of
line outage contingencies to the model, until a solution to the full
problem, including all contingencies, is obtained. The limit on
the number of contingencies added is key to the efficiency of the
method, as it reduces both the size of the optimization problems
encountered and the difference between successive problems.
Moreover, varying the limit on contingencies added provides a
highly efficient way of searching for multiple locally optimal
solutions of the nonlinear optimization problem.
The method has been tested on a modified version of the
highly meshed IEEE RTS with N-1 security. When security con-
straints are imposed, there is a large reduction in the network’s
capacity for new generation, which emphasizes the importance
of considering all relevant physical and operational constraints
in assessments. The method is generic and may be applied at any
voltage level, for other security models and for similarly struc-
tured problems including the analysis of multiple scenarios for
renewable resource availability.
APPENDIX
OPF FORMULATION
A complete specification of the SCOPF model is given here.
A. Nomenclature
1) Base Case OPF: Sets
Set of buses (indexed by ).
Set of lines (indexed by ).
Set of existing generators (indexed by ).
Set of new generators (indexed by ).
Set of external sources (indexed by ).
Set of generators connected to bus .
Parameters
(P,Q) demand at bus .
(max/min) voltage at .
Reference bus.
(max/min) (P,Q) output of existing generator .
Location of , etc.
(max/min) capacity of new generator .
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Power angle of new generators.
Maximum MVA flow on line .
Variables
Voltage (level, phase) at .
(P,Q) output of .
Real power capacity of .
(P,Q) supplied by .
(P,Q) injection onto at (start, end) bus.
2) Security Model: Sets
Set of contingencies (indexed by ).
Set of lines available in contingency .
Parameters
(max/min) voltage at in contingency flows.
Increase in maximum flows postcontingency.
Variables
Voltage at in contingency .
[etc.]
B. OPF Without Security Constraints
1) Objective Function: The goal is to maximize the total
capacity of the new generators
(2)
2) Capacity Constraint for New Generators:
(3)
3) Generation Level Constraint for Existing Generators:
(4)
4) Supply Level Constraint for External Sources:
(5)
5) Voltage Level Constraint:
(6)
6) Reference Bus: Voltage angle is zero
(7)
7) Kirchhoff Current Law:
(8)
(9)
Here, is total power injection onto lines at . The reactive
power line injections include the shunt capacitance term.
8) Kirchhoff Voltage Law (KVL):
(10)
Here, and are the standard Kirch-
hoff voltage law expressions for the power injections onto lines
at the two terminal buses (denoted 1 and 2).
9) Flow Constraints at Each End of Lines:
(11)
C. Security Model
The following constraints are added for all contingencies ex-
plicitly included in the security model, i.e., .
1) Supply Level Constraint for External Connections:
(12)
2) Voltage Level Constraint:
(13)
3) Reference Bus Constraints:
(14)
(15)
The Reference bus is a bus in the contingency flows.
4) Existing Voltage-Controlled Generator Constraints:
(16)
5) Kirchhoff Voltage Law: Constraints take exactly the same
form as (10), but for contingency , a constraint expressing
the power injections in terms of the contingency voltages
is only generated for the available lines .
for lines not in .
6) Kirchhoff Current Law:
(17)
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Durham. Downloaded on March 09,2010 at 07:47:22 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
DENT et al.: EFFICIENT SECURE AC OPF FOR NETWORK GENERATION CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 583
(18)
7) Flow Constraints: The contingency flow limit may be
raised above the base case by a factor :
(19)
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